

Fund report and commentary – 31 March 2008

Overview: The Greencape Wholesale High Conviction Fund (Fund) as at 31 March 2008, posted a return of -13.13% (after fees)* compared with the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index (benchmark), which returned -14.39%.

Performance					
	3 months (%)	1 year (%)	3 years (%) p.a.	5 years (%) p.a.	Inception (%)
Greencape Wholesale High Conviction Fund	-13.13	5.07	-	-	21.85
Growth return	-13.51	-6.57	-	-	12.44
Distribution return	0.39	11.64	-	-	9.41
S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index	-14.39	-7.04	-	-	8.39
Active return (net)	1.26	12.11	-	-	13.46

Returns are calculated after fees have been deducted, assuming reinvestment of distributions. No allowance is made for tax. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Investment objective

The Fund aims to provide capital growth over the long term through a highly concentrated portfolio of Australian shares, and provide returns above the benchmark, the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index, over rolling three-year periods.

Investment manager

Greencape Capital Pty Ltd

Investment strategy


Greencape is an active, bottom-up stock picker. Whilst not targeting a specific investment style and investing in stocks displaying 'value' and 'growth' characteristics, Greencape's focus is on a company's qualitative attributes, which will generally lead to 'growth' oriented portfolios. This is an outcome of Greencape's bottom up process. As such, Greencape's investment style may be classified as 'growth at a reasonable price' (GARP).

Distribution frequency

Quarterly

Suggested minimum investment timeframe

At least five years



Asset allocation		
	Current (%)	Range (%)
Securities	97	85 - 100
Cash	3	0 -15

Fund facts	
	Greencape Wholesale High Conviction Fund
Inception date	11/09/2006
APIR code	HOW0035AU


Greencape Wholesale High Conviction Fund
Nil
0.90%
0.90%p.a.
15% of the Fund's after
management fee return above
the Fund's benchmark.
+0.30%/-0.30%



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Sector exposures as at 29 February 2008




Market Review

The March Quarter of 2008 was the worst since the "crash' of 1987. The S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index fell 15.5%. All months in the quarter delivered negative returns, with March being the fifth straight monthly decline. The last time the market delivered 5 consecutive down months was back in 1992. All sectors posted negative returns over the quarter with the worst sectors being Financials (-24.1%), Consumer Discretionary (-22.6%) and Property Trusts (-19.3%), whilst the best sectors were Energy (-4.6%), Healthcare (-6.4%) and Materials (-6.7%).

The quarter began with all eyes on the US retail sector, with investors looking for signs that that the key Christmas retailing season was impacted by a slowing economy driven by belt tightening associated with sub-prime mortgage borrowers. The market found what it was looking for, and all of a sudden in early January, the market concluded that that the broader economy was in fact being impacted by what is now termed 'the credit crises". This mass realisation resulted in an aggressive across the board equity market sell off in January – essentially the market was pricing in expected downgrades in corporate earnings expectations. Importantly this occurred despite the US Federal Reserve Bank reacting with a surprise 75 basis point cash rate cut in a hastily convened extraordinary meeting of the board, followed by a further 50 basis point cut at the regular January meeting. Despite the concerns towards a slowing economy being largely US centric – after all Australian retailers enjoyed very buoyant Christmas sales - the Australian market was impacted by the negative US sentiment and actually fell further than the US market. This is best explained by the fact that a significant percentage of the

Australian equity market consists of financial stocks (perceived to be directly impacted by the credit

"Our philosophy is we're in the business of making money and not in the business of writing as much top line revenue as we can."



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crisis), highly geared property trusts and infrastructure stocks (concerns around higher funding costs) and resource companies (concerns that a slowing US economy would reduce demand for commodities).

With the aggressive January sell off behind it, and the traditional barometer of "fear and greed" heavily weighted towards fear, the market's attention turned towards the February reporting season. The actual results were generally in line with expectations but outlook commentary was more cautious. The Australian banks suffered further aggressive selling as specific provisions were being flagged for potential bad debts arising from companies impacted by the credit crises. This coupled with further rises in funding costs resulted in expectations for banking earnings downgrades. The sell-off in Australian banks was amplified by their premium price-to-earnings ratios relative to global peers and the fact that the RBA maintained a very hawkish stance during the quarter. The March quarter saw the Australian RBA hike rates twice by 25 basis points. This then led to expectations that the Australian domestic economy may rapidly decelerate resulting in further bad debt experiences from Australian domestic borrowers who have over extended themselves.

March was a very volatile month, with financial stocks leading the market lower during the first couple of weeks. Continuous bad news emerged from European and US

Investment banks with large writedowns of bad positions. This culminated in Bear Stearns being taken over by JP Morgan and other large investment banks announcing further write-downs

"Wealth is not created by financial engineering. Financial engineering tends to be a transfer of wealth."

Stephen Barrow, Chief Investment Officer HOLT Value Associates, quoted in the Barrons Report, 20 Aug 07.

and large recapitalisations. With the bad news confessions emerging, and capital being raised, an aggressive rally began in the last two weeks of March driven by hedge funds buying back short positions and some glimmer of confidence returning as the market perceived that some of the banking bad debt "skeletons" had began to come out of the closet.

Company Visits and Observations

The Greencape research effort largely involved collecting and verifying the information disclosed by companies during the results reporting season which started in February. Following are examples of observations made:-

 The aluminium industry appears to be behaving irrationally. Unlike other resource-based commodities "Profit margins are probably the most mean-reverting series in finance, and if profit margins do not mean-revert, then something has gone badly wrong with capitalism. If high profits do not attract competition, there is something wrong with the system and it is not functioning properly."

Jeremy Grantham, Chairman GMO, quoted in JP Morgan report 19/03/08.




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the aluminium price has not appreciated enough to offset rapidly rising input costs. Key inputs to aluminium production are energy and freight. Cost per tonne of production is up 25% so far this financial year. This coupled with the strength of the Australian dollar has resulted in an extreme margin squeeze for Australian producers in particular. It appears the industry structure continues to favour buyers over producers, with many producers generating returns which do not justify the capital costs. Given the ability to substitute towards Aluminium, and the Aluminium price remaining relatively depressed, demand for Aluminium is very strong with annual global consumption growth running at around 12% with the industry expecting consumption to double from current levels by 2020. Some producers question how long marginal suppliers will continue to supply product at prices that are not economically rational, they do however point out that such suppliers are effectively Chinese government owned producers with financial objectives very different to other Aluminium producers. This highlights potential threats to other commodities where sovereign funds and governments seek industry influencing stakes which can lead to vertical integration between supply and demand. The following charts highlight the significant increase in Chinese production and the relatively flat Aluminium prices over the last 3 years.

China's Alumina Production







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LME Aluminium Prices (USD)



Source: Bloomberg

- Companies which have been actively consolidating their sectors are excited to report that they are no longer competing against private equity buyers when attempting to make acquisitions. However, this is not immediately translating into better priced acquisitions as many acquisition targets have maintained, what appears to, be unrealistic price expectations. It appears it will take some time for the unlisted market to price in the "new lower valuations" now implied by the listed market. This highlights the lagged impact of marking-to-market valuations for assets which do not trade regularly. The ramifications of lagged "mark-to-market" actions on unlisted securities and assets can be expected to be experienced in the unlisted property and infrastructure sectors in coming months. It is important to note that many unlisted property and infrastructure assets are valued once or twice a year. This suggests many quoted unit prices of property and infrastructure funds are yet to reflect the realities of lower asset valuations.
- We continue to observe that the NZ economy supports industries which more
 often than not generate margins which are significantly higher than the same
 sectors in Australia.
- The total listed share margin lending book in Australia is \$38 billion. A 20% fall in equity markets implies a \$7.6 billion fall in the aggregated wealth of margin



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
lending borrowers, this is equal to a quarter of the much talked about \$31billion tax cuts promised by the government.

- The mortgage broking industry is undergoing significant change. The value proposition of mortgage broking is better service (faster approvals) and attractive rates (driven by increased choice of lenders). The credit crises has resulted in the non-bank financial lenders disappearing and foreign banks readily giving up market share to the major Australian banks as a means to preserve capital. This means significantly less choice and reduced bargaining power from brokers resulting in less attractive lending rates. Furthermore, the banks are once again focused on lending standards hence approval speed has slowed across the industry further reducing the value proposition of brokers. To top this off, the acquisition of Rams Homeloans by Westpac has allowed Rams to undercut the broking market. The end effect is broker commissions that were typically 70 basis points upfront and 25 basis point trailing are now threatened. The analogy is what would you expect a travel agent to earn if the choice in airlines was reduced from over 25 down to 5, whilst all 5 remaining suppliers have branch networks which are competitive distribution platforms? The apparent weakening in the industry structure of mortgage brokers provides a rare opportunity for the domestic banks to re-establish their advantage over brokers. The opportunity is large as at its peak almost 50% of new mortgage loans were sold through the broking channel. On average, the value of a loan to a bank which was originated through a broker is around 20% less than a loan sold directly from a bank's own branch.
- Vertical integration in basic industries is a significant development. A case in
 point is Onesteel benefiting from it's iron ore assets as iron ore price increases
 actually assist margins, despite the rising input costs for steel manufacture and
 the timing lag in passing on higher costs through higher steel prices. In contrast,
 rising pulp prices have driven paper price increases are resulting in Paperlinx
 being squeezed as it doesn't own enough pulp assets.
- Vertical integration is playing a significant role in the agricultural input sector. In
 the case of Incitec Pivot, Australia's largest fertilizer producer, its vertically
 integrated business model is very well placed to capture material profits from
 rapidly rising fertilizer prices. The key fertilizer is Ammonium Phosphate which
 has key inputs of phosphate, sulphur and ammonia. The price of phosphate rock
 has spiked as new production capacity has been delayed due to increased
 capital costs and existing production yields have fallen as lower quality deposits
 are exploited.



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Fortunately, for Incitec, they own Phosphate Hill in Australia, a large high quality phosphate deposit located near cheap gas.

Sulphur prices have also spiked with supply interruptions in Canada and the Middle East. Sulphur prices can however be expected to fall once supply resumes, albeit, new capacity in Kazakhstan and Qatar is being delayed due to rising capital costs.




source: Incitec Pivot

Global natural gas prices have trended higher as oil price hikes have lead to some substitution towards gas and environmental concerns are also supporting demand.




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The result of input cost increases is significantly increased fertilizer prices from US\$282 per tonne in 2006 to US\$1,126 per tonne and rising. Incitec's ownership of phosphate rock results in significant value leverage to high prices. Interestingly we note market expectations imply pricing of around US\$850 per tonne in 2008 and 2009 before falling back to only US\$450 per tonne in 2010.



Source: Incitec Pivot

 The recent RBA interest rate increases and additional mortgage rate increases announced by the banks coupled with the equities market sell-off has rapidly dampened consumer sentiment in Australia. Many corporates are



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using adjectives such as "cautious", "nervous" or "tentative" to describe customer demand. Given the prolonged strength in the domestic economy, many management teams and business models have not been tested in a slower economic environment. Below are some charts highlighting the rapid declining changes in consumer sentiment in Australia.



The Australian banks have enjoyed a prolonged period of historically low bad debts.

Figure 17. Bad debts as a % of average non-housing credit

Source: Citigroup Research







Small increases in bad debts as a percentage of what are very large loan books result in very large increases in the dollar value of bad debts to the banks. Citigroup highlights that if bad debts in Australia as a percentage of loans reverts back to the 20 year average, then the banking sector bad debt expense rises from \$2.5B in 2007 to \$8.2B in 2010. The \$5.7B impact to sector profits compares to the sector's aggregated profit in 2007 of approximately \$17.6 B, in other words an impact of over 30%!


Fund Outlook

We believe it is now market consensus that the US economy is in recession. The debate now is how deep and how long. Post World War Two, the average US recession has lasted 10 months.



Post WWII Recessions Typically Last 10 Months

Duration of Economic Recessions



Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Merrill Lynch

When evaluating US equity performance through the last five recessions, it's worth noting the market has bottomed at around six months into a recession. If this held true this time around, it would suggest the sell off in March may have been the absolute low in the market.




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
Stock Market Bottoms 60-70% Of The Way Through A Recession

S&P 500 indexed to 100 at start of recession*



*average of 1969-70, 1973-75, 1981-82, 1990-91, and 2001 recessions Shaded area represents recession period Source: Merrill Lynch

At Greencape we continue to remain cautious. We observe that market earnings forecasts for the Australian equity market continue to factored in margin expansion. We note that in times of economic slowdown, typically margins contract (consider the chart below, where the grey component of earnings per share growth is margin expansion).



Source: Macquarie Research



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This suggests that further earnings downgrades are likely from corporate Australia. As was highlighted in last quarter's commentary, we don't expect the market to perform strongly with a negative earnings revision headwind. We note that the recent sell off has in many cases thrown out the baby with the bath water with the investment horizon contracting significantly such that market focus centres on short

term dividend and earnings delivery. Our research effort has highlighted a number of stocks where we do not consider earnings risk to be negative, yet these same stocks are now significantly cheaper than they were only four

"It's only when the markets are perceived to have exhausted themselves on the downside that they turn."
"Trying to prevent them from going down just merely prolongs the agony."

Alan Greenspan, quoted in the Age 17/12/07

months ago. We are using this period of market uncertainty to concentrate the portfolio towards these attractively priced stocks. We expect than when the market's confidence begins to return, and investment horizons begin to extend beyond immediate news flow, these names will deliver healthy returns.

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